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Sources of Water II: Federal Water Projects
Introduction
A. Summary
Projects in western states financed and constructed
by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers have the capacity to store over
170,000,000 acre-feet of water. In theory, this
water is available for uses different than those to
which it is presently committed. The absence of
environmentally acceptable means to effect the
change of use of a portion of this water restricts
its use to meet changing economic conditions and
values. In addition, an impressive array of federal
and state statutes, permits, compacts, treaties,
contracts, operating policies, and political forces
constricts the movement of much of the rest of
federally stored water to reflect changing economic
conditions and values. Nonetheless, federal water
can play a significant role in meeting growing and
shifting demand for water in the West.
B. General References
1. Wahl, Markets for Federal Water. Subsidies, 
Property Rights. and the Bureau of Reclamation,
Resources for the Future (1989).
2. Reisner and Bates, Overtapped Oasis. Reform
or Revolution for Western Mates, Island Press
(1990).
3. Roos-Collins, "Voluntary Conveyance of the
Right to Receive a Water Supply from the United
States Bureau of Reclamation", Volume 13
Bcologv Law Ouarterly, (1987).
4. Driver, "The Effect of Reclamation Law on
Voluntary Water Transfers", 33 Rocky Mountain
' Mineral law Institute, Chapter 26 (1987).
5. Western Water: Tuning the System, Western
Governors' Association (1986).
II. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
A. jntroduction 
1. The bureau in brief: an agency of the U.S.
Department of the Interior charged with the
construction and operation of water reservoirs
and associated facilities in the western
states. Originally directed to supply water to
irrigate western arid lands as an instrument of
social policy, the bureau now supplies water
for municipal and industrial purposes, operates
hydroelectric generating capacity and provides
flatwater recreation.
2. Resources: The Bureau has constructed about
103 million acre-feet of active reservoir
capacity in the West of which it operates about
87 million acre-feet. The rest has been turned
over to contractors to operate. From this
capacity the bureau provides about 27 million
acre-feet annually for irrigation uses and
about 3 milion acre-feet for municipal and
industrial uses. The great majority of the
water stored in bureau-constructed storage
reservoirs is already allocated for use by
contract, statute, compact and treaty. This
presentation addresses only the reallocation of
water provided by the •bureau, primarily for
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irrigation uses. It does not address the
allocation of "unmarketed" water or
reallocation of water used by the bureau,
itself, for hydroelectric power generation or
other instream uses to other uses.
3. Authorities: The heart of the bureau's
authority is the Reclamation Act of 1902 which,
among other things: created a fund for the
construction of irrigation works, including
storage reservoirs; authorized the Secretary of
the Interior to construct such works; and
provided that the Secretary proceed in
conformity with the laws of the states and
territories in carrying out the provisions of
the act. Other important generic statutes that
bear on the reallocation of water provided by
the bureau include: the Miscellaneous Water
Supply Act of 1920, 43 U.S.C. 521 (1982); the
Reclamation Project Act (1939), 43 U.S.C. 485
et seq. (1982); the Water Supply Act of 1958,
43 U.S.C. 390b (1982); the Reclamation Reform
Act (1982), 43 U.S.C. 390cc. Finally, most
bureau projects have been expressly authorized
by Congress in legislation that often contains
provisions affecting the reallocation of the
water provided.
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B. Real l ocation of water provided by the Bureau
I. There are two ways by which water provided
by the bureau for agricultural use might be
reallocated: administrative reallocation or
voluntary reallocation through transfers of
entitlements to use the water and other means.
Since water provided by the bureau for
irrigation use is supplied by contract,
administrative reallocation is difficult
legally, at least until contracts run out.
Voluntary reallocation of water should be
easier to accomplish legally, but there are
problems.
2. The nature of a contract right to receive
water from the bureau: Does a contractor or
grower have anything to transfer voluntarily?
"Yes": U.S. v. Nevada, 463 U.S. 110 (1983)
holds that the beneficial interest in water
rights held by the U.S. for use within the
Newlands project resides in the owners of the
land. "No" or "Not much": Nevada is limited to
Newlands and similar projects and, thus,
typically, all a contractor has is a contract
right to receive water for use on a particular
parcel of land.	 Does the nature of the
4
entitlement vary from project to project?
3. Impediments: The following is a list of
impediments in reclamation law to voluntary
transfers of entitlements to use water provided
by the bureau. These impediments can often be
overcome without recourse to Congress if there
is a consensus that a particular transfer
should occur. If the consensus does not exist,
they can be stumbling blocks:
a. Absence of explicit policy on transfers
in reclamation law.
b. Confusion regarding whether federal or
state law governs certain aspects of transfers:
See California v. U.S., 483 U.S. 645 (1978).
c. Permissible project water uses: the
Miscellaneous Water Supply Act of 1920 and
Reclamation Project Act (1939), supra, provide
authority for the use of water by a transferee
that is inconsistent with project-authorized
uses. Example of the purchase by the City of
Casper, Wyoming, of conserved water from the
Kendrick Project. But these authorities are
not clear.
d. Project boundaries: the Miscellaneous
Water Supply Act of 1920 may provide some
authority for water to be transfered across a
congressionally authorized service area
boundary, but the authority is, again, unclear.
- e„ Appurtenancy: Section 8 of the Reclamation
Act of 1902 provides that water supplied' by- the
bureau under the authority of this act shall be
used. appurtenant to the land. 43 . U.S.C. 372.
What does this provisiom mean? Has it been
implicitly' repealed by later enactments? See
gi Paso County Water Improvement District v.  EL
aggI 133. F, Stipp 894. (Texas), (1955).
f. Beneficial use: Similarly, section 8 of
the Reclamation Act - of 1902 requires that
"beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right...." 43
U.S..C. 372. Does this create federal common
law- or is this simply a' reference to state law
provisions? See U.S. v .  Alpine' Land and
Reservoir Company, 697 F. 2d 851 (1983).
g. Title to project works: even when a
project is repaid, title to project works
remains with • the federal government. Is this
necessary? Does this impede transfers?
h. Ownership of water rights: The bureau
holds the water rights for some of its
projects. Will this impede transfers? Is it
necessary after a project has been repaid?
i. Secretarial approval of transfers:
Bureau contracts typically require contractors
to obtain the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior prior to making a transfer of an
entitlement to receive water. While there are
legitimate reasons for this provision, will
this authority be abused?	 Is it necessary
after project repayment is complete?
j. Policy on profits: Some bureau
contracts prohibit a contractor from keeping
any of the "profit" from a transfer of water
provided by the bureau. At least one bureau
region--the Mid-Pacific--implements an informal
policy denying contractors a share of such
profits. With subsidized water and contractors
that are behind in repayment obligations, the
equity justification for this policy is clear,
but the policy is a major disincentive to
transfers.
k. Reclamation Reform Act: Section
203(a)(2) of the Reclamation Reform Act of
1982, 43 U.S.C. 390cc, provides that
contractors amending their contracts to receive
a "supplemental or additional" benefit,
commence paying full O&M costs and full cost
pricing on land held individually in excess of
960 acres. Bureau contracts typically require
amendment to permit a transfer to occur. If
the transfer is for more than on an annual
basis, it will likely be construed to
constitute a covered "benefit". This will
discourage transfers designed to provide water
for more than one year.
1. Especially in states in which no entity
is empowered to purchase or hold water rights
for instream flows, the general requirement
that the bureau at least not lose money when a
change is made in the use of the water it
provides may impede transfers to instream flow
uses.
C. policy initiatives to clarify the rules of 
reallocation
1. Western Governors' Association Working Group
recommendations: In 1986 WGA formed a water
efficiency working group to look into barriers
to voluntary reallocation of water in the west,
in particular, of water provided by the bureau.
The group concluded that the Interior
Department should issue a policy statement to
facilitate voluntary transfers of water
provided by the bureau and should make a
TM
comprehensive review of the effect of
reclamation policy on voluntary reallocation.
Western state governors adopted these
recommendations in a unanimously supported
resolution in 1987.
2. In 1987 the Department of the Interior
issued "Assessment '87" in which new directions
for the bureau were announced. Among other
things, the Department announced that it
acknowledged that the bureau's mission in
reclaiming the arid west had been largely
completed and that the bureau would move into
new areas, such as environmental protection and
promotion of project and water use efficiency.
3. In December, 1988, the Department issued the
water marketing policy statement that had been
requested by the governors. See Appendix A,
"Principles Governing Voluntary Water
Transactions That Involve or Affect Facilities
Owned or Operated by the Department of the
Interior". This statement indicates that the
Department will facilitate voluntary
transactions involving water supplied by the
bureau under certain conditions. The statement
was welcomed by those who wanted the Department
to adress water transfers generically.
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However, the statement stopped short of
endorsing voluntary transfers as a means to
	 cm
meet shifting needs. And the language of the
statement is so broad and vague as to offer an
entity little guidance as to how the bureau
would react to a specific proposal to transfer
water.
4. A few months later, the bureau disseminated
"Voluntary Water Transactions Criteria and
Guidance" (provided as part of Appendix A) to
"assist in the implementation" of the 1988
policy statement. This document contains the
following positions:
a. Conflicts with state policies affecting
transfers will be resolved on an ad hoc basis, 	 /
but, generally, state law "should be the
primary mechanism for protecting
sellers/lessors of water as well as third
parties."
b. No additional guidance is given how the
Department will respond to transfer proposals
involving uses unauthorized in legislation or
use of project water outside of authorized
project boundaries.
c. The bureau will explore transfers as
alternatives to new storage facilities if these
10
facilities imply federal financial support.
d. The Department, acting as a trustee for
the Indian tribes, will look into the use of
tribal water where such use would assist local
users in resolving water resource management
problems.
e. The fact that subsidies were used to
provide federal water is not a barrier to a
water transaction.	 "On the other hand DOI
should seek the most appropriate source for
water to be transferred, exchanged, leased or
sold without . regard to presently available
supplies from federal water projects." (?)
f. The financial terms of a transaction do
not conern DOI.
g. Mi transferees will pay an m&i project
rate, but only prospectively.
h. The federal government can be made no
less financially well-off by a transfer to a
non-reimburseable function such as fish
preservation.
i. DOI will avoid burdening water
transactions with disincentives, including,
explicitly, by charging a percentage of any
"profit" a transferor might make on a
transaction.
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These positions go part of the way towards
resolving DOI policy on bureau-provided water
transfers.
5. In recent documents prepared by the
Department, it stresses its commitment to water
conservation as an instrumental means of
dealing with the drought. See "Conservation
and Drought Preparedness", 1990. In these
documents the Department calls for legislation
that would create permanent authority to
"facilitate water transfers or institute a
water market to serve users beyond the existing
service area and authorized project functions."
"Co
D. A review of transfers involv i ng water 'provided by
the bureau
The following is anecdotal evidence of transfer
activity involving water provided by the bureau.
Richard Wahl, Larry McDonnell, and Teresa Rice
assisted in collecting this information.
1. Wyoming
a. Agreement between the Casper-Alcova
Irrigation District and the City of Casper,
1982. Under this agreement the City pays the
District $150,000 per year to produce 7,000
nservation and Drought Preparedness", p. 3.
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acre-feet per year of water salvaged from leaky
irrigation distribution facilities. The City
also has paid off the remaining debt owed by
the District to the federal government
associated with the Kendrick Project.
Municipal use is not an authorized use of
project water, but the bureau permitted this
transfer under the Reclamation Project Act of
1939, supra, which specifies that water may be
shifted from irrigation to other purposes
providing that to do so would not "impair the
efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes." 43 U.S.C. 485 h(c). No such
impairment exists because the salvaged water
was not being beneficially used by the
District.
b. Bureau/Goshen Irrigation dispute. The
bureau insists that the District sign a
contract with the Secretary of the Interior for
use of "surplus" water from the Kendrick
project. Refusing to execute such a contract,
Goshen insists that it is simply borrowing
water from the Casper-Alcova Irrigation
District that the district cannot use under its
contract with the Secretary.
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a. Emery County Project transfers. Utah
Power and Light purchased entitlements to use
water developed for irrigation use for
powerplant cooling purposes. castle Valley
Special Service District uses water provided
for irrigation for municipal outdoor use.
Castle Valley pays for water at m&i rate.
b. Strawberry Valley Project. City of
Spainish Forks proposes a change in the way it
delivers project water. Rules regarding this
change are not certain: Will the bureau approve
the change?
c. Provo River Project transfers. Several
transfers from irrigation to municipal use as
well as a major exchange are facilitated by
acquisition of shares of the Provo River Water
User's Association or members thereof.
3. Colorado: Colorado-Big Thompson project
shares are freely traded to effect transfer of
water use from irrigation to m&i use within the
contractor's service area. There is no cap on
"profits" from these trades imposed by the
bureau.
4. New Mexico:
a. San Juan Chem Project transfers. The
City of Albuquerque leases water it is entitled
cm
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to use for m&i purposes from the project to the
New Mexico Department of Natural Resources
The water is used by the DNR to maintain a
recreational pool behind Elephant Butte
Reservoir on the Rio Grande River. The City
also is attempting to lease project water to
winegrowers. The bureau asserts that acreage
limitations should apply to the winegrowers use
of this water. Should they apply, given that
the City is paying the bureau for the water at
m&i rates?
b. Rio Grande Project transfers. Under
the authority of the Miscellaneous Water Supply
Act of 1920, the bureau approved an initial
transfer of entitlements to use water from the
project from users to the City of El Paso. The
act establishes three conditions for the supply
of water from a project irrigation system for
other purposes: (1) the approval of the
appropriate water user's association be
obtained; (2) there is no other practicable
source of water; (3) water for the other
purpose may not be furnished if it would be
"detrimental" to the water service for the
irrigation project.... 43 U.S.C. 521. In 1988
a similar agreement was entered into by the
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City, El Paso County Water Improvement District
No. 1 and the El Paso County Lower Valley Water
District Authority. This time, the bureau
raised doubts about the transfer: 16 months of
discussion ensued. However, within 30 days of
a visit to the area of the Assistant Secretary
of the Interior for Water and Science and the
Commissioner of Reclamation, the bureau
approved the agreement and the transfer was
effectuated.
5. Arizona 
a. The bureau has facilitated the
reallocation of water from non-Indian
irrigation uses to satisfy tribal water
settlements and to achieve the delivery of
water to Mexico consistent with salinity
requirements.
b. At present there is little demand for
transfer of water provided by the Central
Arizona Project because there is unmarketed
water available from the project. However, if
municipal use continues to grow, the demand for
CAP water transfers will likely develop. CAP
contracts, however, require that any profits
occasioned by a transfer be applied to reduce
the repayment obligation of the contractor--the
1Th
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Central Arizona Water Conservation District.
6. Nevada: There is a market for water provided
for irrigation within the Newlands Project.
For example, water is about to move from
irrigation to wildlife preservation in
Stillwater Marsh. It appears that there is no
cap on revenues that may be earned from project
water transfers.
7. Idaho: The bureau has facilitated two water
banks in the state, permitting water authorized
for irrigation use to be used in power
production and other uses. A restrictive
ceiling on the price that may be charged for
use of water in the banks has been established.
8. California (other than the Central Valley
Project): The Imperial Irrigation
District/Metropolitan Water District transfer.
Under an agreement entered into between the IID
and MWD in December, 1988, MWD is paying the
IID for the costs of permanently conserving
100,000 acre-feet of water, to be available to
MWD annually for thirty five years from the
date of completion or initial operation of the
last conservation project. MWD also agreed to
make a one-time payment of $23 million to IID
to defray "indirect costs." The water to be
17
conserved pursuant to the agreement originates
in the Colorado River and, thus, is subject to
the control of the Secretary of the Interior
under the "Law of the River". As such, the
position of the Secretary regarding the
transfer was a matter of great interest.
1
Essentially, the Secretary kept his distance
from the bargaining positions of each party,
while indicating that he would not stand in the
way of the transfer if it could be worked out.
F. Transfers involving water provided by the Central
Valley Project 
1. The project in brief. The CVP is the
bureau's largest project. It is administered
from the bureau's Mid-Pacific Region office in
Sacramento and through five field fivision
offices. Although developed primarily for
irrigation, the project also provides flood
control, navigation, electric power, mOi and
recreational water use benefits. The Secretary
of the Interior has executed 40-year water
service contracts to supply about 8 million
acre-feet per annum to 270 contractors from one
end of California's Central Valley to the
other.	 Somewhat less than this amount is
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delivered in an average year. About 220 of the
contractors are organizations of farmers or the
farmers themselves. The remainder are mainly
m&i users. Contract rates for most
agricultural contractors have proven to be
inadequate to cover O&M costs of the project,
not to mention to recoup capital costs. Under
provisions of P.L. 99-546, the project must be
paid off by 2030. The project may have as much
as 1.5 million acre-feet of yield not yet under
contract.
2. Tensions under which the CVP operates
relating to reallocation.
a. Many Californians now perceive that
water allocation occasioned by the project has
done great damage to fish and wildlife
resources in the Valley and in the Delta area
east of San Francisco. There is pressure on
the bureau to find additional water for fish
and wildlife from within existing project
resources.
b. Continuing robust growth in m&i demand
for water in southern California (combined with
• the area's loss of Colorado River water to
Arizona as the CAP is completed) and around San
Franciso has many looking at CVP irrigation
19
water supplies as a source of water to meet the
demand. Urban interest in cvP water is
heightened by the current drought.
c. conditions within the valley are
evolving as well. Some agricultural water
districts are water-short under their contract
allocations from the bureau while others appear
to have water they might spare.
d. The west side of the San Joaquin Valley
has a significant drainage problem: Salt build-
up is reducing crop productivity and
concentration of toxics threatens wildlife.
Water conservation, encouraged by the gains to
be reaped through reallocation of the conserved
water, appears to be a significant part of the
solution.
3. Transfer activity involving CVP water.
a. Transfers between CVP contractors.
Transfers among CVP contractors, are common.
During the period 1981-1988, more than 3
million acre-feet was transfered between CVP
contractors. See "Transfers Within the Cenral
Valley Project System", Brian Gray, unpublished
manuscript. Nearly all the transfers were
between agricultural contractors in the same
field division. Bureau policy controls these
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transfers as follows: the transfers are for no
more than the current water delivery year; no
profit on the transfer is permitted; there is
no transfer of the contract entitlement to
receive water, only of the place of delivery.
Transfers between agricultural and m&i
contractors are very rare. These informal
transfers provide a way for water to move where
it is most needed among agricultural users, but
the restrictions surrounding them probably
prevent the development of a larger market.
b. Transfer of CVP water to non-CVP
contractors. While many such transfers have
been discussed--particularly those that would
effectuate the movement of water from the
Valley to expanding urban areas outside of the
Valley--only one such transfer is in the works.
This is the proposed Exchange Agreement between
the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (a
Class 1-water short CVP contractor) and the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California. This transfer is an exchange of
State Water Project water for CVP water.
During relatively wet years, MWD would deliver
to A-E up to 135,000 acre-feet per annum of its
entitlement to SWP water. The water would be
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spread on A-E ground for later retrieval for
use by A-E growers in dry years. During these
dry years, A-E would make about 100,000 acre-
feet available to the mwD from A-E's
entitlement to CV? water. The exchange would
involve the movement of CVP water to the MWD's
service area, but would not result in any less
water available to A-E.
4. Impediments to the transfer of CVP water: In
general.
a. Bureau policy. Generally: The bureau
appears to fear a loss of control over the use
of water provided by the project and, as such,
is concerned about water transfer proposals.
If there is to be long-term reallocation of
water, the bureau prefers to effectuate it
administratively and through contracts rather
than through voluntary reallocation by
contractors. Nonetheless, the bureau does not
appear to oppose those transfer proposals where
there is consensus and where the Valley will
not suffer a net loss of water. Specifically:
Impediments exist to transfers for periods
lasting beyond current water delivery years.
Among the principal ones: No profits on
transfers allowed; no transfers yet for more
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than one season; Reclamation Reform Act
provisions which trigger higher rates for long-
term transfers.
b. Other impediments. Most bureau
contractors appear to be wary of at least
major, long-term transfers of water outside the
Valley. There is a kind of "cultural"
resistance to these transfers--bureau policy
reflects this resistance. But many seem to
wish that the bureau would relax its
"inflexible" policies that discourage
transfers, at least to encourage innovative
schemes, including those that involve conserved
water.
5. Disincentives to water conservation in
bureau policy. No one knows how much water
might be conserved by growers in the Valley
without reducing net income or without
affecting return flow-dependent users or drying
up remaining wetlands. Estimates on the west
side of the San Joaquin Valley range all the
way from a few thousand acre-feet per annum to
over 500,000 acre-feet. Whatever water could
be conserved might be transfered for use on
other agricultural land or for m&i use in the
Valley or elsewhere. And water conservation on
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the west side of the San Joaquin Valley would
make a major contribution to solving the
agricultural drainage problem. But bureau
policies discourage water conservation by
contractors and growers.	 The main problems
are:
a. Water not used by contractors by the
end of the water year cannot be carried over to
the next water year. This encourages growers
to put the water on the land whether it is
really needed or not.
b. For some contractors, take or pay
provisions require payment for water whether
used or not.
c. No profit on sales of conserved water.
In fact, a contractor saving water derives no
benefit from conservation other than where it
can avoid the cost of the water, which, for
many CVP contractors, is minimal compared with
SWP contractors. Permitting retention of
profits on the sale or lease of conserved water
is the best and safest place for the Region to
drop its policy against profits.
d. A "use it or lose" philosophy that
seems to pervade bureau water use policy in the
Valley. Acknowledging that a district can get
24
by with less water may threaten contract
entitlements.
e. The "rules of the road" regarding how
the bureau will react to proposals to transfer
conserved water are not spelled out.
Bureau policy is by no means the sole
impediment to aggressive water conservation in
the Valley, but a rethinking and modification
of CVP policies to encourage conservation where
it would develop water that is now wasted would
help immeasurably.
G. Conclusions regarding Bureau water reallocation
1. Voluntary transfers of water provided by the
bureau occur sporadically.
2. However, notwithstanding the issuance of the
Water Marketing Policy Statement in 1988 and
the Criteria and Guidelines several months
thereafter, the rules regarding these transfers
lack clarity and are poorly understood. Some
key problems:
a. What is the policy of the bureau on
profits from transfers? It appears to vary
from project to project, region to region.
b. What are the rules regarding use of
water for uses not contemplated in authorizing
25
legislation?	 For uses outside a project
service area?
c. What is the new administration's policy
on water transfers and water conservation? Is
it the policy implemented in the Mid-Pacific.
Region? In another region where policy is
different? As stated in recent publications,
cited above? Something else?
III.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
A. Introduction 
.1.The agency in brief. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) is an agency of the Department
of the Army. Among other things, it is
authorized to construct and operate water
storage impoundments primarily for the purposes
of flood control, navigation and
.hydroelectricity generation, although the COE
has built and operates facilities that provide
water for m&i, fish and wildlife conservation,
recreation and even irrigation uses.
2. Resources. The COE operates a large amount
of storage in the West. Its three large
reservoirs on the Upper Missouri River Basin
(Fort Peck, Garrison and Oahe) have a capacity
cm
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of close to 50,000,000 acre-feet. In the
Pacific Northwest the COE operates about
11,000,000 acre-feet of capacity. In general,
the COE has a significant water storage
presence in western states with the exception
of Utah, Nevada and Wyoming. However, much of
its storage capacity is not near expanding
metropolitan areas.
3. The COE's basic authority respecting storage
facilities is contained in the Flood Control
Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. 701. Among other
things, the act authorizes the Secretary of the
Army to construct and operate storage
facilities for flood control and navigational
purposes. Other enactments authorize the
construction of capacity by the COE for other
purposes.
B. The nature of water stored behind COE facilities 
1. Most of the water is stored for flood
control, navigation and hydroelectricity
generation purposes. The water provided for
these purposes is not allocated to entities by
contract or otherwise. No one appears to hold
an underlying equitable or other right to the
water that they may voluntarily transfer to
27
other uses. Thus, reallocation of this water
to different uses would most likely have to be
effectuated administratively.
C. Administrative authorities to market or
reallocate water
1. COE facilities contain space committed to
water for m&i uses. Several million acre-feet
per annum are supplied to m&i users, most of it
outside the West. There remain about 950,000
acre-feet of COE storage capacity allocated to
m&i uses but which has not yet been marketed
for these uses. Most of this capacity is in
Oklahoma. Some is in Texas. One facility is
in Oregon.
2. Both the Flood Control Act of 1944 and the
Water Supply Act of 1958 authorize the COE to
reallocate water stored behind COE dams.
a. Section 6 of the Flood Control Act
authorizes the Secretary of the Army to make
contracts for domestic and industrial uses of
"surplus" water in COE reservoirs, provided
that no such contract shall "adversely affect
then existing lawful uses of such water." 33
U.S.C. 706.
b. Section 301(b) of the Water Supply Act
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of 1958 provides that storage may be included
in any reservoir constructed by the COE or
bureau "for present or anticipated future
demand or need for municipal or industrial
water...." 43 U.S.C. 390b. This appears to be
authority to modify an existing reservoir to
supply m&i needs. However, section 301(d)
provides that if any modification of an
existing project would "seriously affect the
purposes for which the project was
authorized...or...would involve major
structural or operational changes", the COE
must return to Congress for authority to make
such modification. 43 U.S.C. 390b.
The COE appears to interpret these authorities
broadly to enable the agency to contemplate
reallocation of water on an ad hoc basis, if
conditions warrant it.
D.	 Pipeline litigation
1. In its opinion in =SI Pipeline Project v. 
Missouri, U.S. (1988), the U.S. Supreme
Court clarified the roles of the Secretary of
the Interior and Secretary of the Army in the
marketing of water from COE projects
constructed under the authority of the Flood
29
Control Act of 1944.
2. "Facts': 'EMI Pipeline Project (ETSI) had
entered into a AM year contract with the
Secretary of the Interior for the withdrawal of
up to 20,000 .acre-feet per annum from lake Oahe
'in South Dakota for purposes of transporting
coal by slurryfrom Syoming to the southeastern
U.S. Only prOblem was that Lake Oahe had been
constructed and was being operated by the COE.
Sissouri, Iowa and Nebraska sued to enjoin
performance of the contract.
3. Law: Two provisions of the Flood Control Act
enable the Secretary of the 'Interior to
exercise authority at Army reservoirs. Section
5 authorizes him to transmit and dispose of
electric energy from Army reservoirs, but only
When that .energy is, in the opinion of the Army
Secretary, not required for the operation of
such projects. And section S enables the
Interior Secretary to recommend to the
Secretaryof the Army that an Army reservoir be
used for irrigation purposes and to construct
irrigation works if the Secretary of the Army
determines that the reservoir may be :used for
such purpose. Otherwise, the Flood Control Act
is silent on interior Secretary authority
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respecting COE reservoirs.
4. Holding: "The language of the (Flood Control
Act) is plain in every respect, and the
conclusion is unavoidable that if the Interior
Secretary wishes to remove water from an Army
reservoir for any purpose, the approval of the
Army Secretary must be secured." 	 U.S. at
5. Implications: Unless the Army Secretary
agrees, the Interior Secretary cannot
effectuate a reallocation of water stored
behind COE facilities constructed under the
authority of the Flood Control Act of 1944.
IV. U.S. Soil Conservation Service
A. The Soil Conservation Service is an agency of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Under the authority
of the Small Watershed Protection Act of 1954, P.L.
83-566, the SCS has constructed hundreds of small
flood control facilities and a few irrigation
impoundments in small drainages unreached by bureau
and COE programs.
B. Is water from these facilities available for
reallocation to other uses?
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1. Most of the facilities are very small and.
all, by law, have less than 25,000 acre-feet of
storage capacity.
2. most of the facilities have no water stored
in them--their capacity is "dry storage",
available for local flood flows. Thus, there
is little or no "firm" water to reallocate.
3. Where there is water to reallocate--in
particular where water is stored for irrigation
purposes--there appear to be no federal legal
impediments to reallocation. Title to these
facilities is in the local operator.
4. If a local operator wanted to change the
purpose of an SCS facility from flood control
to some consumptive use purpose, the change
would have to be carried out consistently with
the O&M agreement executed by the SCS and the
local operator.
V. Conclusions: 
A. Federal water projects contain copious quantities
of water that, in theory, might be reallocated to
meet growing and shifting demands for water.
B. Voluntary reallocation by holders of entitlements
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to use water provided by the bureau holds promise in
meeting some of these demands. However, complicated
and unclear policies still stand as an unnecessary
barrier to this reallocation. A signal from the
Department that it continues to seek to facilitate
voluntary reallocation would help. So would a
continuation of the effort already begun to clarify
and lend uniformity to the rules governing these
proposals. In particular, the bureau could lend
substance to its present rhetorical commitment to
water conservation by (1) undertaking a review of
the effect of its contract and other policies on
incentives to conserve water among its contractors
and (2) by following up this review by careful
policy changes designed to encourage water
conservation by contractors and their members.
C. Water stored behind COE facilities can play a
role in meeting shifting and growing demands for
water in the West. For the most part, however, the
water will have to be reallocated administratively.





DEPARTrENT OF THE INTERIOR
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTIONS
THAT INVOLVE OR AFFECT FACILITIES
OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
PREAMBLE:
Transactions that involve water rights and supplies are occurring pursuant
to State law with increasing frequency in the Nation, particularly in the
Western United States. Such transactions include direct sale of water
rights; lease of water rights; dry-year options on water rights; sale of
land with associated water rights; and conservation investments with
subsequent assignment of conserved water.
The Federal Government, as owner of a significant portion of the Nation's
water storage and conveyance facilities, can assist State, Tribal, and
local authorities in meeting local or regional water needs by improving or
facilitating the improvement of management practices with respect to
existing water supplies. Exchanges in type, location or priority of use
that are accomplished according to State law can allow water to be used
more efficiently to meet changing water demands, and also can protect and
enhance the Federal investment in existing facilities. In addition, water
exchanges can serve to improve many local and Indian reservation economies.
DOI's interest in voluntary water transactions proposed by others derives
from an expectation that, to an increasing degree, DOI will be asked to
approve, facilitate, or otherwise accommodate such transactions that
involve or affect facilities owned or operated by its agencies. The DOI
also wishes to be responsive to the July 7, 1987, resolution of the
Western Governors' Association, which was reaffirmed at the Association's
July 12, 1988, meeting, that the DOI "develop and issue a policy to
facilitate water transfers which involve water and/or facilities provided
by the Bureau of Reclamation."
The following principles are intended to afford maximum flexibility to
State, Tribal, and local entities to arrive at mutually agreeable
solutions to their water resource problems and demands. At the same time,
these principles are intended to be clear as to the legal, contractual, and
regulatory concerns that DOI must consider in its evaluation of proposed
transactions.
For the purpose of this statement of principles, all proposed transactions
must be between willing parties to the transaction and must be in
accordance with applicable State and Federal law. Presentation of a
proposal by one party, seeking Federal support or action against other
parties, will not be considered in the absence of substantial support for




1. Primacy in water allocation and management decisions rests principally
with the States. Voluntary water transactions under this policy must
be in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws.
2. The Department of the Interior (DO!) will become involved in
facilitating a proposed voluntary water transaction only when it 
can be accomplished without diminution of service to_thase_patties
oInerwise being served by such _Federal resources, and when:
(a) there is an existing Federal contractual or other legal
obligation associated with the water supply; or
(b) there is an existing water right held by the Federal government
that may be affected by the transaction; or
(c) it is proposed to use Federally-owned storage or conveyance
capacity to facilitate the transaction; or
(d) the proposed transaction will affect Federal project operations;
and
(e) the appropriate State, Tribal, or other non-Federal political
authorities or subdivisions request DOI's active involvement.
3. DOI will participate in or approve transactions when there are no
adverse third-party consequences, or when such third-party consequences
will be heard and adjudicated in appropriate State forums, or when such
consequences will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected
parties.
4. As a general rule, DOI's role will be to facilitate transactions that
are in accordance with applicable State and Federal law and proposed
by others. In doing so, DOI will consider the positions of the
affected State, Tribal, and local authorities. DOI will not suggest a
specific transaction except when it is part of an Indian water rights
settlement, a solution to a water rights controversy, or when it may
provide a dependable water supply the provision of which otherwise
would involve the expenditure of Federal funds. Such a suggestion
would not be carried out without the concurrence of all affected non-
Federal parties.
5. The fact that the transaction may involve the use of water supplies
developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered
during evaluation of a proposed transaction.
December 16, 1988
6. One of DOI's objectives will te to ensure that the Federal government
is in an acceptable financial, operational, and contractual position
following accomplishment of a transaction under this policy. Unless
required explicitly by existing law, contracts, or regulations, DOI
will refrain from burdening the transaction with additional costs,
fees or charges, except for those costs actually incurred by DOI in
performance of its functions in a particular transaction.
7. DOI will consider, in cooperation with appropriate State, Tribal and
local authorities, necessary measures that may be required to mitigate





To assist in the implenentation of the December 16, 1988, principles, the
following criteria and guidance are provided. It is anticipated that each
specific proposed voluntary water exchange will be unique, and that it should
be evaluated on its own merits under the overall guidance of this policy
statement.
Principle 1. Primacy in water allocation and nanagement decisions rests
principally with the States. Voluntary water trsactions under this policy
must be in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws.
Criterion.
Guidance:
Does the proposed exchange comply with applicable State and
Federal laws?
Apparent conflicts with State laws or water rights will be
reconciled with the appropriate State agency. State laws
generally provide procedures for transferring water rights, and
should be the primary nechanism for protecting the sellers/
lessors of water, as well as third parties.
Proposed transactions that involve a new use not specifically
authorized as a Federal project purpose, or that propose a place
of use not within the Federal project service area, may require
authorizing legislation. The primary responsibility for sudh
legislation will rest with those entities proposing the
transaction.
Principle 2. The Department of the Interior (WI) will become involved in
facilitating a proposed voluntary water transaction only when it can be
accompliShed without diminution of service to those parties otherwise being
served by such Federal resources, and when:
1. There is an existing Federal contractual or other legal Obligation
associated with the water supply; or
2. There is an existing water right held by the Federal Goverment that
nay be affected by the transaction; or
3. It is proposed to use federally-owned storage or conveyance capacity to
facilitate the transaction; or
4. The proposed transaction will affect Federal project operations; and
5. The appropriate State, tribal, or other non-Federal political
authorities or subdivisions request DDT's active involvement.
Criterion. Does the proposed action involve water that is encumbered by an
existing Federal contractual obligation?
GUidance: If revision of existing water service or repayment contracts is






proposal, negotiations for those changes will be initiated
expeditiously under the guidance of these principles and the
appropriate legal authorities pertaining to the subject water.
Does the proposed action potentially affect a Federal water right?
In those instances where the United States' water rights may be
be affected by a water transaction, DOI will work to facilitate
the transfer so long as its rights or the rights of its
contractors are protected or adequately compensated. In the
evaluation of a proposed action, effects on existing water rights
should be an initial consideration. If the prqposed action would
appear to involve lengthy and costly legal procedures in either
the State or Federal courts, this information should be provided
to the proposing parties. The policy does not provide for the
avoidance of State and Federal laws and procedures in the
establishment of water allocations and water rights.
Does the proposed action propose the use of Federal
storage/conveyance capacity?
Federal facilities may be used to store/transfer both federally
and nonfederally supplied water. The Warren Act provides the
basis for storage/transfer of nonfederally supplied water for
irrigation. Storage/transfer of nonfederally supplied water for
municipal and industrial (MI) purposes can be accomplidhed
generally under the authority of section 9(c) of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939.
Except by mutual consent of affected parties, contracts for
additional storage/conveyance will take into account existing
Federal contracts, conveyance capacity and project Obligations
which must be honored as a first priority.
Approval to transfer water cannot Obligate the Federal Government
to incur extra nonreimbursed expense to store water or to convey
it to a new location.
Approval to transfer Water will not establish any right to future
transfers beyond those expressly provided for in negotiated
agreements.
Use of storage/conveyance will require a supporting contract to
use federally built storage/conveyance systems.
Charges will be set to recover normally allocable storage,
delivery, or extra costs incurred by the U. S.
If any additional pumping power is needed to effect a given
transfer, the transfer entities must provide or pay for such
power, and may have to secure it from non-Federal sources.
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Proposals may involve the corps of Engineers' facilities or
projects. In these cases, consideration of their concerns will be
included in the evaluation of the specific proposal.
Does the proposed action affect existing Federal project
operations?
With a change in type, location, or priority of use, the potential
for effects on the authorized purposes and project operations must
be investigated. For example, such effects could result from
changes in operation of a reservoir or delivery system, that night
change minimum stream flow or power generation. If these
potential effects are identified, avoidance of these consequences,
or mitigation of such consequences to the satisfaction of the
affected pasty, is necessary
As stated in the guidance area 2.(b), WI will work to facilitate
the proposed transfer so long as its (water) rights or the (water)
rights of its contractors are protected or adequately compensated;
and in guidance area 2.(c), except by mutual consent of affected
parties, contracts for additional storage/conveyance will take
into account existing Federal contracts and project Obligations.
Power interference charges or similar compensation measures will
be the responsibility of those entities proposing the transaction.
In addition to the evaluation of effects on existing project
operations, and authorized project beneficiaries, the following
general issues must also be addressed:
1. Third party effects. See Principle 3.
2. Documentation for compliance with NEPA. See Principle 7.
3. Land Classification.
If the proposed action is a change in location of use for
irrigation water, land classification is necessary to ensure
that the land is capable of sustaining irrigation activities
without damage to the land or water resource. Demonstration
that sufficient payment capacity exists during the term of
the transfer may also be required. The level of detail,
amount of original work, and depth of analysis, will be
determined on the merits of each situation.
4. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982.
If the existing contract must be changed to allow the
proposed exchange, the discretionary provisions of the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, must be considered. FOIL*
futher guidance on supplemental or additional benefits and




Solicitor's memorandnut dated May 20, 1988, "Interpretation of
Section 203(a) of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 and
Sections 105 and 106 of PUblic Law 99-546." Additional
guidance is contained in the Acreage Limitation Rules aid
Regulations on contracts, additional and supplemental
benefits, and water transfers.
Criterion.
Guidance:
Does the proposed action stem from a request by a State, tribe or
non-Federal agency?
WI will continue its policy of providing technical assistance to
State, tribal or local agencies. A positive and expeditious
technical assistance/consultation program will continue within
available budget resources.
The specific involvement of WI necessary to amain:date the
requested exchange will determine the type of Reclamation
involvement. Existing procedures for_ approgirg new or amendatory
contracts should be followed.
Principle 3. WI will participate in or approve transactions When there are no
adverse third-party consequences, or when such third-party consequences will be
heard and adjudicated in appropriate State forums, or when such consequenoas
will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected parties.
Criterion: Concerns for third party effects must be addressed from both the
State and the Federal perspective. Any consideration of the
"public trust doctrine" is left to the State. 	 -
Guidance: Concerns for authorized project functions and operations were
addressed in Principle 2. This principle addresses the concerns
for "third party" effects. Third parties are identified as those
entities who may have same identifiable interest in the exchange,
and would have a legal standing in an adjudication process in an
appropriate State forum. The identification of these entities,
the validity of their concerns, and the appropriate satisfaction
of their concerns rests with the States and their adjudication
process.
Principle 4. As a general rule, WI's role will be to facilitate transactions
that are in accordance with applicable State and Federal law and proposed by
others. In doing so, WI will consider the positions of the affected State,
tribal, and local authorities. WI will not suggest a specific transaction
except when it is part of an Indian water rights settlement, a solution to a
water rights controversy, or when it may provide a dependable water supply, the
provision of which otherwise would involve the expenditure of Federal funds.





criterion: Does the proposed action displace the need for expenditure of
Federal funds?
Guidance: Within Reclamation's resource management program, opportunities
will be explored to achieve management Objectives through the use
of voluntary exchanges of water. The intent of this policy is to
ensure that voluntary exchanges of water are considered as
alternatives in water resource management within Reclamation's
planning, operation, and other resource develqment programs. For
example, a water exchange nay be considered as an alternative to
construction of a storage or delivery facility that otherwise
would or could require Federal investment.
Criterion: Does the proposed action provide for an opportunity for the Indian
tribe or community to benefit economically from the lease or
transfer of water rights that may be secured under a settlement
with the Federal Government or with non-Federal parties?
Guidanc:e. It is a common situation that the water rights available to Indian
tribes represent a significant portion of their resource base. It
also is a common situation that the use of those water resources
for agricultural purposes is marginally feasible, and that local
water demands by non-Indians are sudh that the lease or transfer
of the tribal water resources can be a mutually beneficial
transaction.
WI will facilitate transfers, in its capacity as a trustee, for
an Indian tribe to the extent that it results in assisting local
water users in resolving their water resource management problems
within appropriate State law. The specific authorities involved
will be determined on a case specific evaluation of the water
rights, Federal and State laws, and the specific nature of the
proposed transaction.
Princiole 5. The fact that the transaction may Involve the use of water
supplies developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered
during the evaluation of a proposed transaction.
Criterion: Is the water to be transferred, exdhanged, leased, sold, etc.
available by virtue of a Federal Reclamation project?
Guidance: If the Federal Government is not nade worse off financially by the
transaction, if the proposed transaction has been approved by the
State and local authorities, and if the proposed transaction
complies with Federal and State law; then it may be in the public
interest to allow federally developed water to be employed. The
fact that it was developed by virtue of a subsidized Federal
project or program should not, in and of itself, be a barrier to
the transaction.
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On the other hand, WI should seek the most appropriate source for
water to be transferred, exchanged, leased, or sold without regard
to presently available supplies from Federal projects.
Princitle 6. One of WI's Objectives will be to ensure that the Federal
Govenment is in an acceptable financial, operational, and contractual position
following accorplishrent of a transaction under this policy. Unless required
explicitly by existing law, contracts, or regulations, WI will refrain from
burdening the transaction with additional costs, fees, or dharges, except for
those costs actually incurred by WI in performance of its functions in a
particular transaction.
Criterion: The financial terms negotiated between entities do not concern
WI.
Repayment subsidies Accriniated with the original type of use of
the water are not transferable to a different type of use of the
water.
Exchanges cannot result in a reduction in the present worth of
the outstanding obligations neainin; to be repaid to the Federal
Government.
If the proposed exchange would involve the execution of a contract
with a "new" entity, that ehtity must have sufficient legal
authority to enter into such a contract and be able to perform all
functions required by the contract.
Any additional costs aeanciated with the transfer Shall be
advanced or repaid in a manner negotiated by the entities
involved.
GUidance: A distinction must be made between financial terms between the
entities proposing the exchange and Federal repayment
considerations associated with the water. Financial terms : between
the non-Federal entities are extraneous to the repayment
considerations discussed herein.
1. The costs or subsidies associated with the 0,19E11 use
...ere not transferable to a different use of the water.
2. A change in use from irrigation to municipal and
industrial purpose would require a change in the repayment of
costs to include interest during construction and interest on
investment, but only to the extent of the remaining years in
the payout period. It is not the intent of this water
transfer policy to recover subsidies originally allocated to
that blodk of transferred water during the time it served the
irrigation purpose.
A short-term transfer should recognize the repayment of the
appropriate cost, with the repayment interest rate,
calculated for the year of the transfer, after width the
irrigation rate would be reestablished.
A current repayment interest rate for the interest bearing
obligations will be utilized, unless otherwise provided by
law.
Any repayment of principal above the level that would have
been repaid by the irrigators (i.e. the power assistance
amount) Should be reflected in a reduction in the amount to
be repaid through power assistance.
3. An exchange involving change in location and contracting
entities, but not a dhange in use (i.e., irrigation to
irrigation) could involve the continuation of the repayment
subsidies.
4. An exchange in whidh there would be a dhange in use from
reiMbursable function to a nonreimtursable function (e.g.,
irrigation to anadrancus ft-diary) will require special
negotiations. In lieu of special legislation, specific
contractual obligations will be identified to ensure that
repayment to the Federal Government after the exchange will
be no less than the conditions that existed prior to the
S
5. TO the maximum extent possible, financial or economic
disincentives to the transfer or exchange are to be avoided.
The additional costs to the water users, as discussed in
these principles, (i.e., NEPA documentation, power
interference charges, recalculation of water rates, or
incremental pupping costs) are all required by existing law,
contracts, or regulations. While these are costs to the
water user, they are not the disincentives that are to be
-auricled.
The disincentives to be avoided can be characterized as
charging a percentage of any "profit" that night be
envisioned as the difference between appropriate costs, and
the market value of the water.
Itiogiple21. DOI will consider, in cooperation with appropriate State, tribal
and local authorities, neceseazyneesures that may be required to mitigte any
adverse environmental effects that may arise as a result of the proposed
transaction.
Criterion: Is approval of the transaction subject to NEPA requirements?
Guidance: Docasnentation for ccmpliance with NEPA could range from a
categorical exclusion to an environmental impact statement. The
type of documentation required will be a function of the rifl e-
actionteing proposed. Any Federal NEPA compliance costs
associated with the transfer Shall be advanced or repaid in a
manner negotiated by WI and the entities involved.
